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Demography  assumes  increasing  significance  as 
slower  population  growth  -and · ageing,  · keeps · 
- tranforming  at  an  accelarating  rate  the  age-
pyramid.  The conclusion  of the  last  rei>ort'  was 
.  that, given present treQds,  the next 30 years could 
see .the  papulation ·aged  over 60  grow  by  50%, 
while at the same time the number of young people 
· (0-19 years) and adultS (20~59 years) would fall by 
11% and 6% respectively.  · 
The  etfects  of this· marlced  transition  towards ·a 
much 9lder population are set to be felt through to 
the middle of the next _century.  · 
· The  fir~  effects  of  an  ageing  population -are 
~ready being felt  in the field of social protection, 
. particularly  on  retirement  pensions,  but  also  on 
· health.  This will .  place great strain on the  futon~ 
fundilig  of  social  protection  which  is  largely 
dependent  upOn  the ·contributions of the .  working 
population.  The developing trends indicate both a 
fall  in  the  population. of working  age · and  an 
increase  in the  number of older people.  As  their 
number grow,  the role of elderly people 'in  society -
_is  also _  going  to  become  increasingly  relevant. 
Demography  is. thus  already  becoming  a  crucial 
factor  which  must  be . taken  into  account  :when 
. modernising social protection. 
Demographic  change  will  also  impact  on  the· 
characteristics  of the  population  of working  age· 
'  who makes up'  the labour force.  What will be  the 
demographic changes in  this  labour force?  ~t 
effect  will  these  changes  have . on .. the  labour 
market? And will this demographic change require 
specific action? These are the questions which part 
1 of this report tr'y to explore.  ·  · 
The  situation. at  the  EU  level  wiJl  also  have -
conseq~ences  for  regional  balances  .in  socio-
economic ternis. This will be the focus of attention' 
in  part . two  of  this· report.  Will  demographic 
change  help  to  reduce  regional ·differences  or; 
alternatively,.  will  some  regions .  be  faced · with 
growing  imbalances?  Locally,  how  will  it  be 
possible to bring the labour market into line with 
the pools of available _labour?  Will the framework 
for action vary from one region to another?  · 
1 See « The demographic situation  in the 
European Union - 1995 », European Commission, 
. Directorate General V  · 
Part three of the repor:t  tries to  identify the major 
demographic  trends  in  the  12. applicant  States2. 
· This  analysis  will  aim  at  providing  a  better 
understanding of the significance of demography 
for this group of countries which are experiencing 
deep-seated economic change. 
Whether  the  subject  is  - social  protection  . 
employment, or structuial policy, the·_demographic 
variable  is  destined  to  be  an  essential  factor  in 
analysing . problems  and · developiJ!g  appropriate 
policy. The development of a medium to  long~term 
.  perspective in policy-making is of vital  importance 
· to the Union.  ,  ·  -.  · 
The ·Commission  therefore . presents  the  1997 
Demographic Report as- the basis for reflection and. 
reaCtion by policy makers throughout the Union.-
·  2 .Malta·ha~ been included-altl.lough: for the time 
being, this coUntry has frozen its memberslllp 
application. .·;  ·  ·  ·."~  · . ·:  1\\.t{:r ·r  ·  ·'·  .  ·, · · 
l  n~t·>_:ld of  ,dcni(;g;.;tphic dtar~gc on 
~·  thtdai).uu.r n1arlict  ·· 
•  >  ~  .....  • 
Demographic  change  and  the  labour  market  are 
linked  in  many  respects,  three  of which  deserve 
particular attention: 
I.  Demographic  change  modifies  the  internal 
characteristics  of  the ·  labour  market.  By 
changing the structure and the size of the pools 
of  available  labour,  demography  affects  the 
baSic conditions under which the labour market 
operates; 
2.  Demographic change also influences the labour 
market  by  putting  pressures  on  systems  of 
social  protection.  Imbalances. · between  the 
.  number  of .  active  and  non-active  people  not 
only  affect  the  funding  and  organisation  of 
social protection, but also the functioning of the 
labour market itself; 
·  3.  It  is  not  just the  population's age  and  gender 
structure  which  affects  the  active  population, 
but  also  the  demography  of  families  and 
households.  The propensity to  form  or dissolve 
_  couples,  have  children,  child  care  conditions 
and the living arrangements for young and the 
elderly, are all factors which can have an effect 
on whether or not people take up employment. 
On the other hand, the opportunities offered by 
the  labour  market  influence  the .  ·lifecycle  ' 
decisions of individuals and househol4s 
The Commission  highlighted these  three  types  of 
relationship  in  its  last report on  the demographic 
situation, giving an initial quantitative estimate of 
· the  effects  of  an  ageing  population·  on  social 
protection.  However,  the  possible  impact  of 
demographic  change  on  the  labour  market  is 
equally important. This chapter will seek to outline 
what  are  likely  to  be  the  principal . effects  of 
demographic change in this area. 
It must· also  be  remembered that these effects are 
no  more  than  a  backdrop  against  which  other 
factors inevitably come Into play, such as eConomic 
growth and productivity.  Nevertheless,  within the 
limits of our approach,  the analyses  pursued  here 
aim and providind an understanding of the impact 
and  extent  of  demographic  change  and  of  the 
margins  for  manoeuvre  within  the  various 
pop~ation groups. 
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Figure  comyares  the  rate  -of  change  for  the 
·  TJnirm':;  ~~tal · population  t0  the . rate  of ::hange 
'>lit;\iil the ·20.:.04 age group, with reference to  three 
:;.;-~nJrios of  demographic-chnnge
3
. 
T:lT:!e :;onsecutive period.-: can bt identified : 
~·  oveY:  the  past  20·  years;  the  population  of 
';/UT.king age has .increaser1 at  a fnster  rate than 
t~1e toml population: · 
"  ove;- th~ · next  15  years,  the  population  of 
work:ing  age  will · 3tabi1ise  at  a  · relatively 
const;m(  le~;e.!,  while  the total  population will. 
· 3\lh continue to g;·ow;  . 
,,  .· xler approximately  l5 years,  the population of · 
v;-") ·:dng  age  _will  start  to  fall  significantly,_ 
wl:J]:;!  tlle toial  popaiation will  slow down witi1 
a !iiminishing pace.  ' 
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:  I  !JO~'ri.l.!!·U~m  1'f  ·uor~.diq a~1e .  ~.!lhitised in  around 
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Figure 1 
Changes in the total population and·  in the 
population of working age (20-64 years). 
b~  index.of 100 in 1995 for three demographlc 
scenarios 
..•.  ~.:  ............  . 
85 
110 1  Continuation of preioent trent~~> 
105 t· 
1ooES'  ...........  . 
95  ._ ......  >;;./_. ... . 
90  ...  •·•····· ...... . 
85  "'.,  ~ *"  I  I  I  1  I  1  I 
E.  J  §  ~  ~  ~-- ~  ii  ii  _E 
I  ·:·· ..  \ 
I 
I 
~  ~ 
110  r.--;Mu,~~x<.;lm;;:u;:;;l;-;a;;;qe;;<in;;-;q-;------,----.,.--_;_--c:--c 
' 
105. 
100 
95 
90  ·.1 
85~H+~-~~~~~~~--~----~--.~~~~ 
~ ~- ~  ~- ~ ~-~~  ·= =-
-.-- Total populi.tton 
Poi!Uatlon af ..Ur..tng age 
.  -.  . 
Source : Eurostat. observatiOits. uniil-19 9  5. 'prJ;ections'. 
after.that date.  .  . 
.  '  ' 
.. { 
;,\  .~:  ~··. 
'-.  .,  ,' ..  ..  '  .  .,  ., ·'· 
~;\;·~<'·: /  },:<.::.;:);;.~::  ::,;~.;;:;  ..  :~;i·}\·:~\;t}:>.·;~J~t?~f::· .. '.,, .. •  ,,  . 
--·-·  '•j  ....  ~~~'-"o-'~'.,;:.'-'- ·.·  ..  <.~~~~~:.·,: 
7*"::'----;,_:..--:-'-"-_,:.o._;_---.;A  ~ - '~  ;;~~ii 
.• t~;t~~tr~  ~;~;tt~;;c:-;;(:-:·~::::·.  ~:·:\) ?-· 
...  -:·::-·-:-~:-·-· .••.. ·:.:·::.::::::.::::::'·{::::  .·.::··::·:=.·:-.=--::.  Within the limits of the demograr-hic approaci1. the 
measurement of dependency illustrated in figure  2 
can give a good idea of the tension in the sphere of 
social protection-arising 'rrom demographic trends, 
and its impact on the labour nta!·ket: 
Tela!  dependency  l1as  fallen  ove1  the  past  2.0  . 
years  fpr  two  raisuns:  Fir1;\,  bab:'-i~ocm · 
generatic.ms joi.ned (he active ~>or.1trlati;~J:,  se~;ow5 
fl!rtiiity nttes have fai:II.'.n aficr  !.'75; 
¢  . Total  riependency  will  sta1t  co  incrr:as:.  :;.gain,' 
initially  b.:x;;us~~ of smaHt>t  :nfiov.;s of  ,;;;crl:.ir;;~ 
age p::puh:.tion and later, a11er  ).G' I  0, becam:e  01°  . 
the.  retir~.r,Jent cf (ite  bab:;·  'Joom  u.nera;ion~. 
El.derly. peof1k.  growth  w;LL  be  the  !Jrincipd 
source of  mciru r.ro:ection e;.~penri!ture inr:H!<'!'e: 
•  t.:  E.ven if  t~wre is a rt!versal cf fertility trend£,  :iE 
e.aviE;;gect  l:y  the ic:\v ageing scenLio  (~·c~n,~;·:.J  ·  .1 
<<  c l:),  t!ii.s  wif.l  aot..!JC  sufiidem to  prevent  in 
I  rb::  lc::1g  tc:r;!l,  fi~e  relati\•(- ir.cxeas~;. in  C.c 
.  •iq:·:ol.cir.~·.~-::··  n~tio- due  to'  i11e  increase  b  ~;H~ 
!'lf'Jportic,;\ c.;· ddc;~. people. 
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3 A cioser anaiysis allows us  to· estimate the impact 
of  ch~ges  to  the  ·  age-pyramid  on . the  active 
population. How  have changes in  the size of each . 
age  group . influenced  the  growth  of the  active  . 
· populatiorijn the past and how will they influence 
it in the future? The results are set out in figure 3-:_ 
On  the  basis of certain  hypotheses,  this  analysis 
seeks to  determine the factors .leading to a change 
in the .  size of the working  population for  each ·of 
the  three  decades  (see  model  in  Annex  B  and 
explanation on data sources). 
This ~hange  Call be broken down into two factors :  · 
•  .the  "demography" factor,  namely  the variation 
in the  population's  ageisex  structure  and  size 
. alone (thus keeping the activity rates constant); 
•  the  "behaviour"  factor,  namely  the  fact  that · 
·. levels of  activity per age and sex chatlge in time 
(thus the difference between the « real » active 
population and the one obtained .  while keeping 
the activity rates constant).  · 
Figure 3 - EUR12 and EURIS 
Respective roles of the. d~mograpbic  factor and· behavioural factor in producing changes in tbe. size of tlie 
active population. 
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Eurostat. projectzons. of  activity levels  · A~ analysis of past data allows  for  the  following 
conclusions : -
•  in the  Europe of Twelve
4
,  9.4  million  people 
joined the active population between  1985  and 
1995,  a  7%  growth  rate.  During  this  same 
period;  demographic  change  would  have 
generated an iQcrease  of 9.6  million if it  had 
been  the  sole  factor,  thus  200,000  more  than 
actually  recorded.  This  latter  figure  indicates 
the extent of the participation  decr~e in the 
labour market. 
•  als~ between -1985  and  1995,  the.  number of 
jobs rose by just 8.5 million.  As  the number of 
active adults increased more than the jobs, the 
difference  represents  the  absolute  increase  in 
unemployment,  that ·  is  900,000  more 
·unemployed in 1995 than in 1985
5
. 
The  same  approach  has  been  adopted  for  the 
development of future scenarios. 
Apart  from  the  impact  on  emp_loyment  -
unemployment,  the  following  trends  in  active 
population are likely: 
•  we  can  expect  to  see  the  active  population 
increase by about 6.9 million by  the year 2005, 
representing a lower rate of growth than during 
the preceding period. Demographic change will 
contribute less  to  this  increase,  50% of which 
will  be  due  to  increased  partici~ation  in  the_ 
labour market; 
•  over- the following  I 0  years  - 2005  to  2015 --
the active population .could fall  by  as 'much as 
2.15  million.  An expected demographic fall  of 
3 .4  million  people will  be  partly  offset  by  an 
extra  1.25  million  people  participating  in  the 
labour market.  · 
Migra~ory (l{>ws  could  play :.a  significant  rote· in 
_ shaping · ihc·  future  trends·  of  ~Qrking ·age 
; poptW:i_til).ri''._  In  tile  past<accadcii\thcy  haye 
nmtritiritcd .to son it  ·extent  !O  incrcasi"ng  the  size 
. :  ... -.::.:·  '  . 
.. . <::~~~~~  . l  ····-~·~ --;-- -·· 
paia or;: lire  ;u.:ti~\~· population of EUR 15 arc 
only <iv3,ilable froJU  1995 
Between •1985 and 1995, 'peak years for 
unemployment. the total number o(um:mployed 
people grew from around 15  million to  16.8 
million whereby about 900 000 are to be 
attributed to the new L:mders which in this 
simulation arc not taken into account. 
Sec Eurostat scenarios in Anncxe A. 
and reducing the pace of ageing of the working age 
population. 
In brief : 
•  Demographic  change  bas  placed  additional 
pressure on  the labour market over tbe past 
10 years because of a sharp increase in  the 
labour supply.  Together with the growth  in 
female  participation  the  result  was  an 
"'increase in tbe active population. 
•  Even  if  participation in  the labour market 
increases,  we  will  soon  see  a  reduction  in 
tensions· in  tbe  labour  market  due  to  the 
demographic fall; 
•  Changes .  i:it  the  levels  of participation  will 
play  a  greater role in  the future  growth  of 
tbe labour force.-
•  Economic  performance,. productivity growth 
and future migratory trends will  also  play a 
potentially important role. 
5 In the above,  trends in the population of working 
age  ancl  the ·  active  population  were  seen  to  be 
closely linked. But what is the situation within this 
population? 
Figure 4 shows that it is going to experience some 
major changes in age structure : 
o  · A .distinctive  feature  of the  past  20  years  has 
been the· entry of all the baby-boom generations 
to  the  population  of  working  age.'-This 
produced  a  major  increase  in· all  age  groups, 
especially the intermediate 30-49 age group; 
·"  ·In  contrast  to  this.  the  next  20· years  will  see 
considerable imbalances in  the  contribution  of 
the various age groups. The 20-29 age group. a 
grcup  which  replenishes  the  population  o( 
working  age, ·. will  fall  by  11  million,.  the 
intennetEate  group  will  remain  at  its  present 
size,  and the  oldest  group  (50-64  years)  will 
increase by 16.5 mimon, which is over 25%. 
In brief: 
Within· the  populalioa  of workirg  age,  the 
distinctive feafure of :he next 20  years will be a 
very  ~eipnd grO.wth between the different age 
gnnlps,  breildng  the  balance of the  :pllst  20. 
years. 
Figure 4- EUR15 
·.·Increase in c~rtain age groups between 1975-1995 and 1995-2015 
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6 A  further  analysis  is  needed  as  the  ageing 
indieatcrs highlight two rupt:me poi.nts. 
Th.~  size  of the  expected  fall  ii:1  tlt<!  nurnber  of 
peopie aged between 20 and 29 ccu.piea.  v.-~tli  ti1e 
increase  in  those  aged  between  50  and  E4  wiii 
result in a  marked ageing of  the available pooi  of 
labour.  · 
The change in the average age of the populaticn 
agcd.betw~.oefl 20 and M, as ilLustrated in figure 5. 
is art initial indication of this changing trend. 
o  This average age  scarcely changed during the 
years 1975-1995, when it remained just over 40 
years; 
I 
e  Since  1995  it has been a  marked tendency for 
the average age to increase, as a comparison of 
the cwves'  ·  g:1'.dient fer the two  t~eriods dearly 
Ulustrates; 
c·  After having  rer:nained.  stable  for  lhc  ('ast  20 
ye;;rs, the average a.ge wiLl  increase by 2.5 years 
on  averr.ge  by  the  2015,  a  considerable 
increase. 
1,.  ,  ..  ,.  • f  r  Lrl iiJ:I:'TC:: 
I  . 
i  Stt~Kh11g irn  1995, Mdi  co~tlur:tdl!l:fE  I!Jeyml'~  2€H5, 
tire  Ei.VIl!H'Il!ge  age  af the wm,killig  &ge  po!Jui~ermt 
wfH ~~WW  ~ cm:u:rOieii"Wfe ll!ll!d' CG!!!!:fiJmt inCnCWle. 
Source : Eurostat, observations until 1995, proJections after that date. Baseline sce11ario 
7 ··I  2010, second rupture point 
The second  point  relates  to  the  relative  share of 
those expected to join the active population for the 
first  time,  i.e.  the  20-29  age  group,  compared  to 
those who are dose to leaving it. i.e.  the 55-64 age 
group. Fi~e  6 shows that:  · 
•  The  share  of the.  20-29  age  group  has  been 
constantly falling since the early  1990s,  while 
around  the year 2000  the  share of the  oldest 
group will start to rise; 
o  In .  20 10  the two  groups  will be  level  pegging, 
each representing ~me fifth of the population of 
working age; 
.,.  After  this date.  the oldest group  in the  active 
population  will  account  for  a  progressively 
larger share of the active  population  than  the 
20-29  age  group.·  At  the  same  time,  the 
poptilation of working age as a whole will start 
to fall. 
fu brief 
a  From the year 2lHO  mnvards, older wot:kers 
wiU  .  accm:~nt  for  a  greate1·  share  of  1~1~ 
popuhttion  c)f  workin~. !lge  thnn  .ymmgu 
W3:-kers  ~bose · share  wiU  prognssive!y 
decnaae. 
e  The  intermediate  group  (30-54  years)  will 
first increase, then..stabilise and later begin 
•  to_ fall  due  to  th~ knock-on  effect. uf these 
cbange3. 
Figure fi -· EUR15 
Respective shares of the 20-29 and 55-64 age groups in the working age population (20-64 years). 
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8  . In  the  past,  the  renewal  of  the  population  :of 
working age,  i.e.  i:he  ability to  replace generations 
leaving tbe labour market by  those coming  in  to 
jotn it, has served to: 
o  supply tbe highest growtb sector£; 
c:  contribute to the system's productivity by virtue 
(I  ~he  fact  tbat  young  peopte  have  lower 
cost/productivity ratio : 
e  make a contribution of new sl.dlls and flexibility 
in all sectors. 
It  is interesting to  illustrate this renewal  by  means 
· oftwo additional indicators. The first estimates the 
balance  between  incoming  and  outgoing  flows 
(figure  7-a).  Tlus  gives  us  a  good  idea  of the 
change  in the  size  of the  population  of working 
age.  The  second,  more  qualil:ative,  ·indicator 
examines  the  ratio  between  numbers joining and 
leaving  the  la~our market  (figure  7-b):  this  is 
essentially a replacement indicator. 
•  In terms of balances, tbe decrease which began 
in  1990  will  result  in  more  departures  than 
entries by around 2009. 
•  In  terms of ratios. the replacement rate will fall 
by  35% over 20 years:  in  1995  there were  140 
entries for 100 departures: by 2015 there will be 
90  entries for  100  departures,  and thus  a  net 
deficit 
.  .  .... 
r.  J)~ogre£!h'ery,  tbere  wilE  he  le&£  scope  to 
adjui:t  the  Ia~our- marf?;et:  ~y mean~ of  tbz 
flow! of  e~L~ries  ·and departw.·e~ ; 
i  e  Demogravhic  chaage win  ~roooce megatn~£ 
renew&i  .  P!abm~  fOil"  tbe  ~opula('im:;,  of 
working  ~ge.  The  possibiKttie!  of  skm 
reoewru  d:ue  solcly  to  the  entry  of  you~mg 
_1  people wifi be limited. 
Figu>e 7 - EUIUS 
7-a : Differences between incoming and outgoing 
flows for the population of working age 
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Source : Eurostat, observations until 1995, projections after that date:  Baseline scenario. 
9 Is  it  possible  to  determine  in  more  detail  how 
demographic change ·is  going to  effect  the active 
population? Some interesting findings are obtained 
by  distinguishing by  sex and age::  group; between 
the effects of demographic change and behavioural 
change on the size of  the active population:_ 
'The  differences  between·  generations,  and 
especially  between  the sexes,  are clearly  marked: 
•  The  increase  in  the  total  size  of the  active 
population recorded between  1985 and 1995  is 
unequally distributed b_etween  the  ~xes, while . 
the demographic c~ntribution. which is  similar 
between the sexes.  is not. the. same· for all  age 
groups: 
•  BetWeeQ  i 985  arid  1995.  entry .  to  the  labour 
market fell  by  200,000. This fall  is principally 
attributed  to  the ·decline  for  men,  and  young 
.men  in  particUlar.  Employment  among  all 
young  people  aged  between  20  and  29. 
regardless of sex,  fell  during this period.- This 
could  in  part  result  from  the  prof!ounced 
demographic  contribution  of  the . preceding 
generations,  which  may  have  blocked  their' 
access to the' iabour-market, as well as from the 
long-term  tre~d for  increased  participation  in · 
education  · and  training  · of  the_  younger 
generations: 
•  There has been a sharp increase· in employment 
:among women over  30  during this  period.  In 
the  intermediate  group  (30-49  years).  more 
· thim  50%  of  the  increase  active  women 
recorded between  1985  and 1995  is due to  the 
increased participation of women in the labour 
market 
•  Among  older ·women  workers~  participation 
. behaviour  was  responsible  for  virtually. the 
entire  increase  in  activity: 
•  The  demographic  contribution  among  the 
youngest workers has  started to  fail  and.- after 
· 2005.  it  will  only  be  the  oldest workers  who 
· will  bring any  increase  due  to- demographic 
change: 
•  In terms of behaviour, and still on the basis of 
the  hypotheses  for  changes  to  the  active  · 
. population,  female  participation  will- continue 
·to  increase,  even ·among younger generations. 
_By contrast, between 2005 and 2010. there will 
. be reduced male participation in all age groups. 
In brief: 
o  The  separation  between  the  behavioural  . 
effect  aucl  de~nograpbic effect  reveals  the 
change in the size o{ reserves in  the labour 
stlpply procfueeil by d~()grapbic  effects; 
•  Among  young  people  hi  particular,  it  w_ill 
cease to be possible to Offset the demographic 
fall by increaSed p~rticipation;  . 
•  Apart  from  the  potential:- offered  by 
.occupational  and.  geographical  mobility, 
women  constitute  tbe  main  resource  for 
employment  . groWth,  especially  · young 
women,  who .  when  they·  grow  older,  will 
bring  a  higher  participation  and 
employment _rate.  · Figure 8- EUR 12 and EUR15 
Respective roles of the demographic factor and the behavioural factor in producing 
changes 'in the size of  the active population, per age group and gender, for three periods.  .  .  . 
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CONCLl 'SION  .. 
. The  anaJysis  of _changes  in . the  pojmla:tion  of 
working  age  .reveals-the  extent  to  which  future 
economic  growth  Will  . be  dependent  on 
quantitative and qualitative changes in the labOur 
force. 
· The stabilisation and then faJI  in  the size of the 
population of working age could prove a favourable 
· factor  in  reducing  imbaJances  between  labour . 
supply and labOur demand. However, it will aJso be 
necessary to deal  with a  considerable  increase  in 
the  pressure  of .ageing  on  sociaJ  protection,  , 
..  especiaJiy  for  pay-as-you-go  pension  systems. 
Keeping 'older workers  in  employment for  longer 
. could be,  in certclin  sectors,  a  key  ele!Jlent  for  at 
least partiaJiy countering this problem. 
·.  Howe\te~. keeping older workers in employment for 
more years will add to a second concern-linked to . 
the demography  of the  labour  force:  •  its  internaJ 
ageing.  Thu5._  :adaptability  to  labour  demand 
· · chl'lnges  will  have  to  be  obtained  more  from 
resourceS  aJready .  in . the  labour: force  rather than 
from new cohorts joining the labour market. Active 
measures  such  as  re-quaJification.  life  long  · 
learning, measures to ensure employability will  be 
required  in  ,order  to  adapt  skills  and  ensure.  · 
economic competitiveness. 
Stronger  economic  ·growth  is  becoining  a 
fundainentaJ factor in supporting sociaJ protection. 
provided this growth translates into an increase in 
jobs and  increased  recourse  to  existing  pools  of 
labour. ·For women  in  particular.  this  recourse  is 
subject  to  certain  constraints.  An_ innovative 
approach will be' necessary,  including· measures to 
promote  access  to  · the  traditiollal  employment 
. market (reconciliation of work and family life). the 
absorption  of .  hitherto  exclusively  voluntary 
activities  by  the  market  economy  (community 
actions,  responsibility  for  family  care through tax 
incentives,  etc.),  ana  more  flexible  work 
organisation.  All  types  of  mobility  will· pl~y  a 
greater role during the years to come. 
7  See, among others.  «·The new role of women- Family formation in Modern Societies» edited by Hans-
Peter Blossfeld  .. SociaJ inequality series, Westview Press, 1994 or« Fani.illes, travail et politiques familiaJes 
en Europe». L.  Hantrais and M-T. Letablier, Cahier du  Ceri~re d'EtUdes de I'Emploi. PUF, 1996 
,.  .  '  I 
11 P.\RI" 2 
Tht• :-;igniticann· of  t~te n·gional 
dimcnsimn 
The  previous  chapter  showed  that  there · are 
important liDks  between demographic change and 
· the  labour  market.  However,  the  aggregate 
approach often fails  to provide the  most  effective 
means  of examining  these  linkS.  Among  other 
things,  it  is  not  suitable  for  understanding  the 
widely differing trends at regional level. 
The  strongly  diverging  situations  found  among 
regions  suggest  that  the  impact  of demographic 
change could be  open  to  different  interpretations 
than that provid~d by  th~ agg_regate approach. 
This · is  confirmed  by  the  regional  analysis 
presented in this section. 
The Union's  regional  diversity  can  be  illustrated 
with reference to  many criteria.  Among  the  most 
visible  aspects  is  the  uneven  population 
distribution,  with a  large share of rhe  popuiation 
concentrated in a comparatively ·small  part· of the · 
territory. Possible population change, as illustrated 
on Map  1,  is  also  of particular  interest.  Among 
other  things,  it  helps  to  highlight  differences  in 
future demographic patterns between regions. 
· This is particularly interesting because,  ~  shown 
in chapter one, a stage characterised by a constant 
and  balanced  demographic  increase  in  the 
population of working age  is  now  giving  way  to 
one  of  "demographic  neutrality",  soon  to  be 
followed by one of  negative growth. 
Map  I  shows  the  growth  index  for  each  region 
compared to its population in  1995' On the basis of 
their stage of demographic growth, regions can be 
,grouped under three headings: 
•  Regions  which  have  already  reached  the 
negative growth stage, such as the former East 
Germany,  Saarland  and  pan . of  Westphalia. · 
northern Italy,  Asturias and Aragon  in  Spain, 
and Lorraine in France; 
•  The vast majority of the regions are likely to go 
towards  a  period  of  demographic  .neutrality 
between 1995 and 2015: 
•  Finally, sustained growth is found in about one-
fifth of the  regions,  located  in a .  greater urban 
districts  and  in  the  south  of Spain  .. France.  , 
Italy,  Germany,  the United Kingdom.  Belgium 
and Greece.  ·  .  . 
In brief:·  . 
•  :Most of the Union c:ountries show an u~even 
regional  pattern . of  future  . demographic 
'nnrth·  g  ' 
• . The same country can  preSent a  variety of 
situations  in·  terms  of  .demographic 
dynamism; 
•  Regions with similar characteristiCs tend to 
•  fofoi a·Ciiister witb·neigbbouring re~ons. 
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-·:Map 1.. 
•. •J•1  ..  :'b  ... \·.  ' <:;,  .....  ,,  ,'I J , 
'.' ·'  ; ':· :·:.' Although there is a marked difference between the 
regions in terms ~f the stage of population gro\lth 
they  have  reached.  ageing  is  a  phenomenon 
common to _all  of them. Since 1995, the proportion 
of people aged over 65  has been increasing in  all 
areas.  The  results  of this  growth  of  the  older 
popuiation arc presented on Maps 2a and ib which 
illustrate the proportion of people aged over 65  as 
part of the total population. 
By 2015 the following developments are likely: 
•  As  expected. the rate of ageing and, above alL 
the current· population structures vary from  one 
region to another; 
•  The  proportion  of  elderly  people  will  be 
particularly high in northern and  central  Italy 
· where  they  will  account  for  a  qumter  of the 
population; 
•  To  a  lesser  degree.  there  will  also  be  a 
preponde~ance of elderly  people  in  nmthem 
Spain  and.  in  a  more  dispersed  way,  in 
northern· and  eastern  Germany,  Greece  and 
some central regions of France; 
•  The  regions  which will  still  have  a  relatively 
younger  population  will  be  more  limited -in 
number  arid  more  localised.  The  areas  in 
question  . are  southern.  Spain  ~d  central 
Portugal.,,)~Ireland,  ..  Apulia  <irtct  Campania  in 
southern I@y, northern France and Flevoland. 
The Easr,Midlands in the U~ted Kingdom and 
Alsace ai&{more isolated pockl!ts.  .  ·· 
~  ~  ·'  ~-"'"'~  -~<i'  ·~  -~ 
.  :·•-.::~- -..:~ 
In brie!: 
e  Although  apparent everywhere,  population 
ageing  will  occur  at  varying  rate!l  and 
degrees,  affecting .  ·il'opulations  with  very 
different:initial age structures. The t'estdt in 
20  yea~ time will: be; a  Weater  diversftv Gf 
age structure in ilie regiaos.  · 
0  A.geine  . doos  . not  nccessruily  reslllt  in  a: 
population  d~rease.  In  2015  signf11{;:rnt 
population increases wm  be coupled \7itb  a 
q11ih~: ofd pop&rlation strnc(urf. 
•  Tile. conili[mt!iGn  of  &  can.~idei'all~e fail  irt 
flopn£8t1on  and lL  muc:.h  o[ner·  (10f1u~auarr:, ar 
i'ocnd in nortben1 Italy ~n;d Sr;,aln:, rnd iu the 
former  East  Germany,.  mggc.:st~:  signiricz.nt I 
demographic decline. 
•  As  mcniim:.~d  in:.  c.Iur~ter  Ic  (fu:.  klttun; 
ttrospec(s  are alw poterttlafky  fliflm::.rrc(,rc  !'iiv 
economic  perf<>nnance ::md  mr:;ratm.)·  flaw~ 
at regiorr.l!l ieve[.  - --------------
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Proportion of people aged 65 years and over as part of total population in 2015 
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r .•  :.·  .....  · It  has  been  seen that older population will  grow  · 
substantially  in  most  European  regions  over  the 
next decades.  This becomes a major concern since- _ 
the population which must bear-this extra cOst  is 
simultaneously shrinking. Map 3 -gives, at regional 
level,  the  year -'when- the  active  population  is 
exspected to  start to fall for demographic reasons. 
In other words,  it  shows  the dates  when  the  net 
demographic contribution to the active population 
will  cease.  The methodological  basis  used  is  the 
same  as for  the  global- analysis  in  part  on~ (see 
Annex B). 
•  Sev_eral geographical areas,. incluping the ~hole 
of southern  Germany,· France,  Italy_ and  the 
United Kingdom, will find  ~at over the next 2 
decades  natural  demographiC  change  _will 
de.;>ress the numbers in the labour force. 
-•  Three major geographically compact areas will 
find themselves in exactly the opJ)osite situation 
with  a  substantial  reduction  of the  potential 
labour  supply  by  the end of the- century.  The 
-regions in question are the ~hole of Italy lying 
·north  of Molise;  all  areas  of northern  Spain 
lying  between  Catalonia -and  Gaiicia,  the  far· 
north  of  Germany,  North~Rhine  Westphalia, 
Saarland, Lorraine and Flanders. 
•  The analysis of the year in which a decrease of 
· the active population, for  d~mographic reasons. 
will-start shows two separate peaks. On the one 
hand,  many regions will  experience a  reversal 
of trends before or shortly iller the turn of the 
century.  On the other hand,  many regions will 
experience  this  after  2010.  Very  few  regions 
will see trends reverse. during the period 2000-
2010. 
·-
lin brief: 
•  There is  a  ten-yeair  difference  between  tbe 
regitms  in  terms  of tbe  reduction.  of  the 
pOtentiaUabour ~pply. 
.  ·'  .· 
•  Several'  groups. •  of  regions  have . already 
experieneed a •  decrease  in tbe demographic: 
contributio1r to  tbe  active  population.  This 
increases the risk. of  a  lab(ijlr shortage  in 
eei'taio  a~as. · 
14 ·Year in which the active age popUlation will start to fall 
due to demographic _reasons 
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Map3 Another aspect of ageing has implications for  the · 
laboUr  market,  namely  the  ageing  of  potential 
labour forces.  In  this section,  estimates are based 
on the population aged between 15 and 64 years, as 
these  are  the  only  age  groups  for  which  the 
statistics used are available. 
Map  4  shows  the  rate  of ageing,  with  a  growth 
·index for the 50-64 age group as  part of the total 
population of working age ranging from \I 05% to 
160% between 1995 and 2015: 
• .  The French,  Dutch,  Belgi~ and  Irish regions 
show  a  very  high  rate  of ageing  within  the 
population of working age. 
•  Regions , with  an  initially  elderly  population 
(Germany,  northern  ·Italy)  show  a  more 
moderate ageing of the active population. 
•  Irrespective of the rate of ageing, the analysis of 
.the  age  structure  of active  persons  (share  of 
over 45s within 15-64 age gioup) shows that it 
is in the Gennan regions that the jxlpulation of 
working age  is  likely  to  be  the  oldest  in  the 
Union in 20 years time.  More than 40% of the-
over 45s in the  15-64 age group will  be  found 
in these regions. 
•  In neirly all  the  other regions,  the  45-64  age 
group will  represent mote than a  third of the 
population of  working age. 
•  A lower proportion of.25% will.only be  found 
in four isolated areas in 2015:  southern Spain, 
Ireland,  Brittany,  Nord-Pas-de-Calais and half 
of the Benel"'x regions. 
1m brief ( 
o · Combined with the falll  in tbe demographic 
' cOntribution,  tlhe' . geweral  ageing  of  tbe 
>population  of  working· age  amplifies  the 
regional:. significaiice-of  this phenomenon _for 
the ~abour  market.  ·  ,  · 
•  Germany  and  Italy generally  sh~w- a· morr 
pronounced  ageing  of  the  population  of 
working age. · 
•  -With the exception of certain isolated areas, 
this phenomeoon also affects, with a different 
timing, all Europe's regions: 
15 ·Map4 
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--~·-. Three underlying trends relating to demographic effects have been identified : 
l.  The. major difference between the regional picture and national situation; 
2.  The  polarisation  of certain  demogr:aphic  and economic  trends  with  implications  for  the  convergence 
·process: 
3.  The potential 'demographic imbalances w~ich could Wldermine the functiorung of the labour market due 
to a labour shortage, 
,. 
While there are various uncertainties concerning any scenarios for future· demographic patterns in the regions, 
it seems likely that the Union will face new challenges in this regard in the .next century. National arid Union 
policies will have ·to ensure that labour resources are optimally used in regions where there are scarce. while 
seeking to ensure that new job opportunities are created where they are in surplus and w.here Wlemployment is 
persistently  high.  While some geographical mobility of labotir is inevitable in a .market economy,  the  main 
challenge  for· 'the  future  is  to  ensure · the  occupational  mobility  of the  workforce  in  a · c<intext  of rapid 
technologic~ change by providing necessary skills. ·  -~  · 
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_  Demogt·aphic trends in the applicant States  _ 
Union enlargement is one of the major milestones 
on the road to European integration. Over the next 
years  at  least  some  of the  12  present  applicant· 
States. could find their place within the European 
Union  (sec ·footnote  in  introduction  concerning 
Malta). 
It is therefore only fitting to complete our outline of 
the  principal  demographic  challenges  facing  the 
Union  with  a  brief  review  of the  demographic 
future which awaits these countries. 
The aim here is not to undertake a detailed analysis 
but  rather  to -identify  points  on  which  these 
countries converge or diverge, both with respect to 
one  another and to  the  present  EU  countries,- in 
terms  of  the .  challenges  which  their  respective 
demographic development could generate. 
What is the demographic picture of these countries 
in economic transition? An initial indicator. given _ 
in figure  9.  measures the population growth index 
between  1995 and 2015.  An almost general lack of 
growth is observed: 
•  Whereas between  1995 and 2015  the Union  is 
going to  see  a  population increase despite  the  / 
demographic slowdown. this will  hold true-for 
just four· of the candidate States  : Poland and 
the Slovak Republic, Cyprus and Malta. 
•  If Cyprus  and Malta,  whose  small  population 
renders  the  increase  incomparable  with  the 
others, are excluded all the applicant countries 
will  have demographic growth  inferior to  that 
of  the Unio~. 
·.  Figure 9 -Applicant States 
Total population growtb between 1995 and 2015 
- (base 100 in 1995)  · 
- Sources·_.  llnited Natiom. Worlcl Populatio11 Prospect 1996 (applic~nt  States) - Eurostat, Demographic Projections I 996, 
Hclsl'lillt' sn·nm'io (Fl IU /5) 
What  will  be  the  implications  of demographic 
change  for  the  labour  market  in  the  applicant 
States? As  in the case of the previous analyses. the 
principal  conclusions  can  be  ~rawn  from  two 
indicators: dependency rates and the growth of the 
population of working age.  The results.  presented 
in figure 10, allow for the following conclusions : 
•  Some of those countries set to e:-.:perience a fall 
in total population over the neXt 20 years will 
17 also · experience  a  significant  fali  in  the 
population  of  working  age  over  this·  same  · 
.period.  . 
•  Poland  and· the  Slovak  Republic  will  see  the 
population of working age grow at a faster rate 
than the total-population.  . 
•  Dependency ratios provide a more detailed view 
of the differences between countries in terms of 
demographic· ageing.  The dependence of older 
{  . 
people in all the  ~pplicant States is lower th3n 
in the Union. Five of them neve-rtheless  have a 
higher  proportion  of .older  people  than  young 
people,_ with  relatively  high  dependency  rates 
(Estonia,. Hungary,  Slovenia,  Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republjc). 
•  Polan~ and t,he  Slovak Republic are worthy of 
particular  note  among  the  countries  with  a 
younger population structure. 
.  .  Figure 10 - Applicant States 
Development indicators for the population of working age (15-64 years) between 1995 and 2015 
lOa- Growth index for the population of  working age (base 100 in 1995) · 
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18 The observed slower demographic growth for most 
of the Eastern European· States is explained by the 
low  fertility  rates,  the  high  mortality  and  the 
important  migratory  o~tflows. observed  over  the 
last  years.  Total  fertility  rates  have  declined 
. substantially over the last decade bringing some of 
these States to levels lying below EU.average, 
.  However,  the  demographic  ageing  is  not  so 
advanced in these States because of their relatively 
higher mortality patterns.  · 
These patterns refer to children under one year of 
age  (high  infant  mortality  rates),  and  the  mo~ 
elderly members of  the population. 
Figure  1_1-plots each country with reference to  tWo 
. variables  which,  generally  speaking,  serve  as  a 
development indicator. 
•  Leaving aside atypical cases such as Malta and 
Cyprus,  with a very different  history  of social 
and economic development  than  the  I  0  other 
applicant  States,  major  efforts  are . needed  in 
order to reduce this mortalitY. 
•  Slovenia and the Czech Republic seem to  have 
made  progress · in  this  respect,  with  infant 
mortality rates of  below IO·per 1000 . 
•  Romania  has  very  high  infant  mortality  rates 
and a quite low life expectancy. Together with_.. 
the Baltic States and Hungary,  it has  achieved 
the  poorest  performance  in  tenns  of . life 
expectancy. 
Figure 11 - Applicant States 
Infant mortality·and life expectancy at birth in 1995 
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~  - Conclusion  .  . 
Although  it  will  come  later  and .  to. a  lesser  degree,  population  ageing  will  also  affect  Eastern  European 
countries. In half of these States demographic trends have already opened the door to increased pressure on the 
social protection system which even now is experiencing difikulties.  · 
These  States  arc  also  going  to  experien'cc  a  sometimes  significant  fall ·in· the  population  of working  age. 
heralding problems of a simil:ir n:Hure to those with which European Uriion will be faced after 20 10 ..  A future 
of sust:uncd growth would require the activation of the existing labour force reserves. Developments in Po,land 
·and till'  Slodk.- Rcpuhli0  might  he  somehow. ditTcrcnt.  Sustained economic  gro\\th and .job .creat.ion  will  be 
ll'lJIIIIl'tl  Till· gulf hl·tw,·di the  ~iti~:s and !he  ~ountryside may pose a special challenge in .these.States. 
These  States  will  also  be  confronted  with  other challenges.  in  particular in  the  area of health.  in  order  to 
unprovc their high monality rates. 
19. ANNEXE-
.  A.  SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU POPULATION (1995~2015) 
A  verage num  er o  Cl  b  f  h'ld  ren per woman · 
1995  '2000  2005  2010  2015 
High  1.50  1.75  1.87 .  '  1.91  1.92. 
Low  '1.42.  1.40  1.40'  1.40  - 1.41 
Baseline  1.45  1.55.  ·1.60  '  1.63  1.64 
Old  1.42  1.40  1.40.  1.40  1.41 
Young  1.50  . ·1.75  1~87  1.91  1.92 
.-.  Life expectancy at birth (Men) 
1995  2000:  2005  . 2010  2015 
High  74.3  75.5  . 76.9  78.1  79.2. 
'  Low  73.5  73.9  74.3  74.7  75.0. 
..  Baseline  73.9'  74.7  75:6  76.4  - 77.2 
Old  . 74.3  75.5  76.9  78.1  . 79.2 
·Young  73.5  73.9.  74.3  74.7  75.0 
LifeJexpectancy at birth (Women) 
1995  2000  2005  2010  2015 
High  80.7  81.7  82.7  - 83.7  84.4  -
Low  80.1  80.5  80.9  81.3  81.5-
Baseline  - - 80.4  81.1  81.9  - 82.5  83.1 
Old  80;7  .  81.7  82:7  83.7  ''  84:4 
·voung  80.1  80.5  '•  80.9  . 81.3  81.5 
_,  ·•  Annual migration balance (in thousands) 
.  .  1995-1999  2000-2004  2005-2009 .  2010-2014 
High  - 934·  977  840  788 
.Low  527  391  388  396  -
·Baseline  719  654  605  592 
Old  -527  39.1  388  396 
Young  934  977  840  788  ., 
,. 8. METHOD OF CALCULATING THE DEMOGRAPIDC AND BEHAVIOURAL EFFECT 
(ACTIVITY RATE EFFECT) IN CHANGES IN THE ACTIVE POPULATION 
On the basis of the population aged between  15  and 64 per year of age and per gender in  1995, and 
demographic projections for the population aged between  15  and 64 per year of age and gender up to 
2015, for each gender we have,  · 
for  ; P, 
P;,, 
O'i,t 
and·for  ar;,, 
AP;,, 
AP, 
-
population aged between 15 and 64 in year t 
population of  ~ge i in year t (i ranging from  15 to 64 years) 
percentage of age i complement in  15-64 age group complement' in. y~  t,  the 
vector (c:r1s, c:r64),defining the structure per age in year t, so that 
P;,1 I P,  = c:r;,,  with 1:  c:r; = l· for year t 
activity rate for year of  age i in year t 
active popul~tion of  age i in year t 
total active pqpulation (15 to 64 years) in year t 
the followj.ng relations: 
AP;,,  ar;,, x  P;,,  ·=  ar;,, x  c:r;,,  x P, 
APt  =  1:;  (ar  i.t x  c:r;,, x P,) 
and the variation in the active population between two different dates as follows: 
MP  ·1:;.  (ar;  x  c:r;  x .1P) + 1:;  (ar;  x  .1c:r;  x  P) + 1:;  (.1ar;_ x  c:r;  x  P)  +  s. 
demographic e~ect  ..  .  ·  activity rate ~ffect  residue 
· that is the sum of  the two effects: 
•  an ·activity rate.effect, expressed by the variation ·in the active population with a  ~onstant 15-64 age 
group  complement  and  constant  age  structure; . this  expresses  the  degree  of participation -in·  · 
employment of  a given complement; 
•  a  demographic effect,· expressed by the. ·variation in  the active population wil4 a· constant activity 
rate per year of age and constant age stRJcture;  this demographic effect combines an effect linked to 
the complement and an effect linked to its age composition.  .  '  . 
As  the me! hod  was applied to  ~ach of .the  Union countries. the residual  factor  E  linked to the discrete 
nature l)fthe time series has never exceeded 2.5% of  the total variation. It was ignored in the analysis of 
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